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suggest that voluntary disclosure in China is positively related to ﬁrm size,
leverage, assets-in-place, and return on equity and is negatively related to audi-
tor type and the level of maturity or sophistication of the intermediary and
legal environments. We also ﬁnd some evidence to suggest a quadratic convex
association between state ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, our
analysis provides no evidence that extensive disclosure beneﬁts public compa-
nies in China in the form of a lower cost of equity.
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Voluntary disclosure is a common way for a public company to disseminate company information not
required by mandatory disclosure requirements to its investors and the general public. Earlier studies have
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266 Y. Lan et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 265–285speciﬁc areas. For example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) claim that
voluntary disclosure can reduce information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. More-
over, empirical studies carried out by Barry and Brown (1986), Botosan (1997) and Piotroski (1999) demon-
strate, among other things, that voluntary disclosure helps to reduce the cost of equity.
However, more recent studies have indicated that the abovementioned beneﬁts may not hold for all stock
markets. Using a dataset comprising 110 public companies with both A- and B-share listings in China, Wang
et al. (2008) investigate the eﬀects of voluntary disclosure and ﬁnd no evidence that these companies beneﬁted
from that disclosure in the form of a lower cost of debt capital. Their analysis suggests that voluntary disclo-
sure in the Chinese stock market exhibits determinants and characteristics that may be very diﬀerent from
those found in the stock markets of developed countries.
We intend to carry this line of thought further by investigating more closely the determinants and conse-
quences of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market using a much larger dataset – 1066 Chinese public
companies – than that used in Wang et al. (2008). This extensive dataset represents about 80% of public
companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges that have a relatively complete historical record of annual
reports.
Our investigation is motivated by two considerations. First, since their establishment in 1990 and 1991,
respectively, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have become major global stock exchanges in
terms of total capitalization, trading volume and the rapid pace of growth in the number and size of public
companies. Also, a large individual investor population trades shares on both exchanges and China boasts
an ever-increasing number of institutional investors. Further, foreign investors with Qualiﬁed Foreign
Institutional Investor (QFII) status have also begun to invest directly in the Chinese stock market. Previous
studies have found that both individual and institutional investors in China are less experienced and more
restricted than their counterparts in developed countries such as the United States (Chen et al., 2004; Bailey
et al., 2009; Deng and Xu, 2011), which may inﬂuence their understanding of ﬁnancial reports and, in turn,
aﬀect the disclosure motivation of listed ﬁrms. The growing complexity of China’s stock market calls for a
better understanding of the key aspects involved, which will beneﬁt investors, public companies, and regu-
lators alike. Voluntary disclosure is one such key aspect, the eﬀects of which concern all of these market
players.
Second, China has a distinct political and geographical environment. As an emerging economy, China’s
capital market is not as eﬃcient as those in developed countries, such as the United States. Moreover, the
country’s regulatory environment is less mature than those in developed countries, which have taken half a
century or more to develop. Also diﬀerent from more mature economies, the majority of listed companies
on the Chinese stock exchanges are ultimately controlled by the central or local governments owing to the
country’s long history of a planned economy. These ﬁrms are called state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A large
percentage of SOEs are in essential industries, rich in resources, and directly responsible to the government,
and often enjoy rights and privileges unavailable to private companies. Consequently, they have diﬀerent
corporate governance mechanisms compared to ﬁrms listed in the United States, most of which are
privately controlled (Xu and Wang, 1999; Qiang, 2003; Clarke, 2003; Wang et al., 2004). These corporate
governance mechanisms result in the Chinese stock market having a number of distinct characteristics that
in turn inﬂuence the determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure by the public companies listed
in China.
These two considerations suggest both the necessity and the particularity of an in-depth, thorough
investigation aimed at reaching a better understanding of the nature and eﬀects of voluntary disclosure in
the Chinese stock market.
Some studies have been conducted in this and related areas. Ferguson et al. (2002) examine voluntary dis-
closures in the annual reports of SOEs listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and conclude that these com-
panies tend to disclose signiﬁcantly more information than other companies listed on the same exchange.
Using a dataset of the 300 largest public companies at that time, Xiao et al. (2004) analyzes the factors behind
Chinese listed companies’ voluntary adoption of Internet-based ﬁnancial reporting and the extent of their
disclosure. Wang et al. (2008) conduct a more focused study to test the determinants and consequences of
voluntary disclosure in China using a relatively small sample comprising only ﬁrms issuing both A and B
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greatly expanded dataset.
The dataset we use includes all companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges at the end
of 2006, with the exception of banks and insurance companies. The level of voluntary disclosure is modeled by
DSCORE, an index score generated on the basis of the voluntary information released in ﬁrms’ annual
reports. This score has its origins in earlier studies, such as those of Botosan (1997), and is tailored to the Chi-
nese context.
A set of factors commonly investigated in the literature, including ﬁrm size, leverage, liquidity, assets-in-
place, return on equity (ROE), auditor type, and ownership diﬀusion, among others, is analyzed to determine
the eﬀects of each on voluntary disclosure. Our statistical analysis reveals that ﬁrm size, leverage, assets-
in-place, ROE, ownership diﬀusion, and auditor type are signiﬁcantly associated with voluntary disclosure,
with auditor type strongly associated. However, our ﬁndings suggest that liquidity and the proportion of
non-executive directors on the board have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on voluntary disclosure. We also add
two Chinese market-speciﬁc factors, the intermediary and legal environments and state ownership, to the
regression to test whether they play any role in the voluntary disclosure decision. Although most of the fore-
going general factors remain signiﬁcant in this regression, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relationship
between the intermediary and legal environments and voluntary disclosure.
With regard to state ownership, we conjecture that it has a quadratic convex relationship with the level of
disclosure, as there is both theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest a more complicated association
between the two than a linear relationship. To further test the inﬂuence of state ownership and governance,
we carry out another test by ﬁrst dividing the sample into two subsets based on the ﬁrms’ ultimate owners and
then performing the regression separately on each subset.
In this test, many of the aforementioned factors lose their signiﬁcance in one or both subsets. For ﬁrms
ultimately controlled by the government, ﬁrm size, ROE, auditor type, the intermediary and legal environ-
ments, and state ownership remain signiﬁcant and in the same direction as those in the general regression.
For ﬁrms ultimately controlled by private families, leverage, auditor type, ownership diﬀusion, and state own-
ership remain signiﬁcant. This evidence demonstrates the diﬀerent characteristics underlying the disclosure
preferences of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. What is particularly notable is that the signs of the coeﬃcients of state
ownership in the two regressions are opposite: the level of disclosure decreases with state ownership in pri-
vately controlled ﬁrms, but increases in government-controlled ﬁrms. These results reveal a clear quadratic
association between state ownership and voluntary disclosure, as predicted.
To test the relevance of voluntary disclosure to the cost of equity in the capital market, we construct an
ordinary least squares (OLS) model between the two. The results of the model reveal no evidence that ﬁrms
beneﬁt from extensive voluntary disclosure in terms of a lower cost of equity, which is contrary to the claims
made in studies of stock markets in developed countries. In China, voluntary disclosure appears to have no
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the cost of equity.
This study contributes to a better understanding of the determinants and features of voluntary disclosure in
the fast-growing Chinese stock market. By examining a much larger dataset than previous studies and testing a
wider range of factors, we are able to report relatively reliable, more general results and to oﬀer useful insights
into investors, public companies, and regulators with regard to voluntary disclosure in the Chinese context.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops our hypotheses with the help of prior
theoretical results. Section 3 describes the sample dataset and test methods, and Section 4 reports the empirical
test results. Section 5 analyses the regression results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Hypothesis development
This section develops 11 hypotheses that are subjected to statistical testing. These hypotheses are devel-
oped with reference to two well-known theories, agency theory, and signaling theory, which are brieﬂy
reviewed here in the context of voluntary disclosure. The section also oﬀers a discussion of relevant issues
such as corporate governance, litigation risk, and proprietary costs. This review and discussion provide the
foundation and justiﬁcation for the explanatory variables extracted and considered in our hypothesis
development.
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Agency theory suggests the existence of information asymmetry, and thus possible conﬂicts of interest,
between investors and ﬁrm management. Consistent with this theory, management’s incentive to engage in
voluntary disclosure has been shown to be inﬂuenced by such factors as leverage and assets-in-place (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Hossain et al., 1995).
2.1.1. Leverage
Previous studies have provided mixed evidence on the relationship between leverage and the level of
voluntary disclosure. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Fries et al. (1993), Hossain et al. (1995) and Barako et al.
(2006) suggest that the two are positively related in developed markets and in some emerging markets, and
Francis et al. (2005) obtain results consistent with this suggestion using a multinational database. Chow
and Wong-Boren (1987) and El-Gazzar et al. (2008), in contrast, claim that leverage is not a determinant
of voluntary disclosure, as they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between the two in their analysis. Eng and
Mak (2003) ﬁnd a negative relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure using a Singaporean
sample.
However, the widely held view remains that ﬁrms with a higher degree of leverage suﬀer serious agency
problems and incur higher agency costs. Leveraged ﬁrms are more likely to disclose more information volun-
tarily to satisfy the information acquisition requirements of creditors and to lower the cost of raising capital.
Fama and Miller (1972) provide a classic result along this line, showing that a positive relationship exists
between ﬁrms’ voluntary disclosure and the degree of leverage owing to high agency costs. Using the ratio
of total debt to total assets as a measure of leverage, we develop the following hypothesis to test our conjecture
that there is a positive relationship between leverage and the level of voluntary disclosure among Chinese pub-
lic companies.
H1. A ﬁrm’s disclosure level is positively related to its degree of leverage.2.1.2. Assets-in-place
Myers (1977) asserts that the degree of diﬃculty a ﬁrm has in transferring wealth between shareholders and
debt-holders grows with larger assets-in-place. The implication is that fewer agency problems and less infor-
mation asymmetry may exist in ﬁrms with larger assets-in-place, thus indicating a positive relationship
between assets-in-place and disclosure.
An alternative explanatory theory is proprietary cost theory, which posits that the potential entry of new
competitors into a market inﬂuences the future proﬁtability of established ﬁrms in a given industry. Therefore,
ﬁrms that are protected in their sectors by high entry barriers are likely to disclose more information than
ﬁrms that are not.1 Fixed assets are usually employed to measure proprietary costs, as they are an easily mea-
surable indicator of barriers to entry. It thus appears likely that a positive relationship exists between larger
ﬁxed assets and voluntary disclosure.
However, the existing empirical research reports conﬂicting evidence from diﬀerent countries. Bradbury
(1992) and Hossain et al. (1995) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between assets-in-place and the extent of vol-
untary disclosure in New Zealand, whereas Haniﬀa and Coode (2002) report a positive relationship in
Malaysia.
As China is still in the early stages of a market economy, the assets-in-place barrier is very important to
many ﬁrms, as it protects them from potential competitors. Thus, we conjecture that there is a positive rela-
tionship between assets-in-place and voluntary disclosure across the board in Chinese public companies, as
stated in our second hypothesis. Note that we use the ratio of ﬁxed assets to total assets as our measurement
of assets-in-place.
H2. The disclosure level is positively related to assets-in-place.1 Proprietary costs can be measured by barriers to entry. More details can be found in Darrough and Stoughton (1990) and Darrough
(1995).
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Signaling theory posits that ﬁrms with good performance tend to make voluntary disclosures more readily,
as doing so is regarded as an easy means of distinguishing themselves from others in the marketplace. Hence,
we conjecture that voluntary disclosure is positively related to ﬁrm performance and quality. Both Chow and
Wong-Boren (1987) and Lang and Lundholm (1993) provide empirical support for this supposition.
2.2.1. Liquidity
Liquidity represents a ﬁrm’s ability to meet its short-term liabilities. Firms with greater liquidity are con-
sidered to be operating better businesses. In accordance with signaling theory, these ﬁrms are prone to disclose
more information voluntarily (Cooke, 1989).2 Agency theory, in contrast, suggests the opposite conclusion: to
alleviate information asymmetry, ﬁrms with less liquidity are likely to release more information to investors,
creditors in particular. Indeed, several studies (e.g., Wallace et al., 1994) claim that weak liquidity may prompt
ﬁrms to amplify their disclosure to justify their liquidity status.
The empirical ﬁndings on the liquidity-disclosure relationship are also inconclusive. Wallace et al. (1994)
document a negative relationship between liquidity and disclosure in both listed and unlisted Spanish compa-
nies, whereas Alsaeed (2006) and Barako et al. (2006) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship in Saudi Arabia or
Kenya. No previous study in China has taken liquidity into consideration. Using the current ratio as a proxy
for liquidity, we conjecture that there is generally a positive relationship between the two in Chinese public
companies, as stated in the following hypothesis.
H3. The disclosure level is positively related to liquidity.2.2.2. ROE and auditor type
Under the signaling theory framework, ﬁrms with strong performance and good quality have more incen-
tives to voluntarily disclose information to distinguish themselves from underperforming ﬁrms. Singhvi and
Desai (1971) claim that greater proﬁtability may induce management to supply more information, to illustrate
its ability, to maximize shareholder value, and to elevate managerial compensation.
Auditor type (or rank) is popularly employed as a signal to the market. Financial reports audited by higher
ranking auditors are regarded as better in quality and more credible. However, the literature provides mixed
evidence in this respect. Using a relatively small dataset, Xiao et al. (2004) ﬁnd a positive relationship between
the Big 5 (or Big 4) auditors and internet-based voluntary disclosure in China.3 However, several studies
(Hossain et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Alsaeed, 2006) have shown that neither Big 5 (nor Big 6) auditors nor
ROE have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on management’s disclosure decision.
We use both auditor type and ROE as proxies of ﬁrms’ performance quality and posit a positive relation-
ship between both proxies and voluntary disclosure in Chinese public companies, as stated in the two follow-
ing hypotheses.
H4. The disclosure level is positively related to a ﬁrm’s ROE.
H5. Firms audited by the Big 4 are more likely to disclose information voluntarily.2.3. Corporate governance variables
Firms’ level of corporate governance also appears to be an important inﬂuential factor in their decision to
make voluntary disclosures. As many studies argue, sound corporate governance mechanisms are treated as a
sign that the ﬁrm in question has strong management and better monitoring in place, which in turn leads to2 Cooke (1989) provides evidence to show that ﬁrms with a higher degree of liquidity enjoy a sounder ﬁnancial position. Therefore, they
are more willing to disclose information than those suﬀering a low degree of liquidity.
3 The sample used by Xiao et al. (2004) is made up of the 300 largest listed companies in China, which is a much smaller sample than that
used in this research.
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evidence to support that argument in Singapore and the United States.
2.3.1. Ownership diﬀusion
Ownership diﬀusion is a variable used to measure a ﬁrm’s governance mechanism. The more diﬀuse its
ownership is, the better able its owners are to monitor managerial behavior and thus require greater informa-
tion disclosure. Alsaeed (2006) ﬁnds a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the
ownership diﬀusion in Saudi Arabian companies. Hossain et al. (1994) and Haniﬀa and Coode (2002), in con-
trast, show that the level of disclosure among Malaysian companies is inversely related to their ownership dif-
fusion level. Many other empirical studies have failed to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship.4
We use the average shareholding proportion, which is the total number of shares divided by the total
number of shareholders for each individual ﬁrm, as a measure of ownership diﬀusion. Informed by corporate
governance theory, we hypothesize a positive diﬀusion-disclosure relationship in the Chinese stock market.
H6. A ﬁrm’s disclosure level is positively related to its degree of ownership diﬀusion.2.3.2. Proportion of non-executive directors on the board
Similar to ownership diﬀusion, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board are also a measure of
corporate governance or monitoring capability. Non-executive directors are less aligned with management and
are therefore more inclined to encourage ﬁrms to disclose a larger amount of information to outside investors.
Jaggi and Yee Low (2000) ﬁnd empirical evidence to show that the proportion of independent directors have a
positive inﬂuence on disclosure, and Xiao et al. (2004) produce similar results using a limited dataset in China.
We conjecture that the same relationship holds for Chinese public companies more generally and test this con-
jecture using a much larger and more general dataset than that used by Xiao et al. (2004).
H7. A ﬁrm’s disclosure level is positively related to the proportion of non-executive directors on its board.2.3.3. State ownership
State ownership is a somewhat distinct feature of the Chinese stock market. Before China implemented
market reforms and adopted an open-door policy, almost all ﬁrms in the country were totally owned by
the government. These ﬁrms are referred to as SOEs. It was only after 1978, and especially after 1990 when
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were established, that the Chinese government began to encour-
age private business and, at the same time, took a series of actions to promote the privatization of SOEs.
Although an increasing number of public companies are owned by non-government entities, a majority of
listed companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges remain ultimately owned by the central
or local governments.5 Even in ﬁrms that are ultimately controlled by a private family, state ownership still
plays an important role.
Compared with other types of ﬁrms in China, particularly private ﬁrms, state-owned ﬁrms tend to be per-
ceived as suﬀering from more severe information asymmetry, agency problems, and adverse selection costs.
Such a perception may prompt the management of these ﬁrms to disclose additional information to ease inves-
tors’ concerns regarding their quality, the role of the government as a major shareholder, and other issues.
Wang et al. (2008) indeed ﬁnd the level of disclosure to be positively related to the proportion of state
ownership.
In contrast, Ferguson et al. (2002) argue that because red-chip ﬁrms face a more uncertain situation and
higher competition costs on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, they seem to disclose less information than
H-share ﬁrms. State ownership has also been associated with a lack of emphasis on eﬃciency and proﬁtability,
which suggests a negative relationship between state ownership and disclosure. Consistent with this argument,
Xiao et al. (2004) ﬁnd that companies with a higher proportion of state ownership make fewer internet-based4 See, for example, Raﬀournier (1995) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008).
5 In our sample, 722 of the 1058 ﬁrms were ultimately controlled by the government, with the other 366 ultimately controlled by private
families.
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common linear relationship, and there may be a more complicated association between state ownership
and voluntary disclosure. Tian and Estrin (2008) ﬁnd that the relationship between state ownership and cor-
porate value is U-shaped, and Fan et al. (2006) ﬁnd that most Chinese listed ﬁrms are ultimately controlled by
local governments and private entrepreneurs. We posit that when the proportion of state ownership is rela-
tively small (usually in privately controlled ﬁrms), less state ownership means more uncertainty and more com-
petition, which induces ﬁrms to disclose more information voluntarily. After a certain point, however, when
state ownership accounts for a large proportion of total shares (usually in state-controlled ﬁrms), agency the-
ory starts to apply. Thus, the higher the proportion of state ownership, the more severe the agency problem
and the more voluntary disclosure there is to alleviate that problem and lower the cost of capital.
H8. A quadratic relationship exists between state ownership and the disclosure level: the disclosure level
initially decreases with state ownership, but then increases with ownership after it reaches a certain point.2.4. Litigation risk-related variables
Litigation risk also tends to prompt ﬁrms to make voluntary disclosures. Previous studies show that litiga-
tion risk is always under consideration when the management of a ﬁrm makes a voluntary disclosure decision.
Field et al. (2005), for example, show that ﬁrms with greater litigation risk tend to voluntarily release more
information. There is also some evidence that ﬁrms with bad news are more willing to disclose information
to avoid possible lawsuits.
2.4.1. Intermediary and legal environments
The legal environment obviously aﬀects the voluntary disclosure level of the ﬁrms operating therein. La
Porta et al. (1998) claim that when investors have relatively few legal rights, managers can be induced to return
money to them if one or a very small number of them owns the majority of shares. Evidence from Jaggi and
Yee Low (2000) suggests that ﬁrms from common law countries are associated with higher levels of ﬁnancial
disclosure relative to ﬁrms from code law countries.6
However, previous studies on voluntary disclosure have paid insuﬃcient attention to the legal and interme-
diary environments of listed companies, single-nation research in particular. For reasons to be stated, it seems
that the legal environment may have a strong bearing on the voluntary disclosure behavior of public compa-
nies, particularly in China. China has a more diverse geographical range than many other countries, leading to
a more diversiﬁed market and greater regional disparities in the legal environment. At the same time, for rea-
sons of policy and history, the development levels in China’s various regions and provinces have not been
even. For instance, diﬀerent provinces may have diﬀerent preferential policies or rules to encourage investment
and the growth of local niche sectors. Such unevenness contributes to a distinct legal environment in China,
and it is in this environment that Chinese public companies must operate.
The legal environment also shapes the development of an intermediary environment, the sophistication of
which obviously plays an important role in shaping the behavior of public companies. In a more advanced
intermediary environment, ﬁrms tend to disclose more information to satisfy intermediary institutions’
requirements for more information. Fan et al. (2007) create an index to measure the development of a com-
bined intermediary and legal environment for each province in China. We use their index for 2006 in this
study. Based on the foregoing arguments, we predict the intermediary and legal environments to have positive
eﬀects on ﬁrm disclosure. Consistent with Jaggi and Yee Low (2000), we also predict that intermediary
advancement and legal system development have positive eﬀects on voluntary disclosure.
H9. The disclosure level is positively related to the level of development in the intermediary and legal
environments in which a ﬁrm operates.6 La Porta et al. (1998) claims that “relatively speaking, common law countries protect investors the most, and French civil law countries
protect them the least. German civil law countries are in the middle, though probably closer to the civil law group.”
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Voluntary disclosure may burden the disclosing ﬁrm with the so-called proprietary costs. Verrecchia (1983)
was the ﬁrst to take proprietary costs into consideration when modeling management’s disclosure decisions.
When information that may reveal certain crucial aspects of a ﬁrm’s operations is disclosed to investors, it is
also disclosed to the ﬁrm’s competitors, which may disadvantage it competitively (Lev, 1992; Darrough, 1995).
In this regard, ﬁrms tend to hide information when proprietary costs are suﬃciently high.
2.5.1. Firm size
King et al. (1990) investigate the relationship between disclosure and ﬁrm size. Their study of the so-called
transaction cost hypothesis indicates that the level of disclosure increases with ﬁrm size, as the incentives for
private information acquisition are greater for large ﬁrms. An alternative explanation is the legal cost hypoth-
esis (Skinner, 1992), which posits that disclosure increases with ﬁrm size because the dollar value of securities
litigation damages is a function of ﬁrm size.
Other work has produced similar results. Lang and Lundholm (1993), for example, ﬁnd evidence to show
that larger ﬁrms tend to disclose more information in the United States. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987),
Cooke (1989), Hossain et al. (1994, 1995), Depoers (2000) and Eng and Mak (2003) report similar results
for Mexico, Sweden, New Zealand, France, and Singapore, respectively. A previous study in the Chinese mar-
ket using a sample of listed ﬁrms issuing both A and B shares (Wang et al., 2008) suggests a positive relation-
ship between ﬁrm size and disclosure.
Drawing on signaling theory, we predict a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and disclosure in the Chi-
nese stock market in general, not just in particular sections of the market. To test this prediction, we develop
the following hypothesis and use the natural log of a ﬁrm’s total market value as our measure of ﬁrm size.
H10. The disclosure level is positively related to ﬁrm size.2.6. Cost of equity
With reference to agency theory, Barry and Brown (1986) conclude that ﬁrms with a high level of disclosure
are more likely to have a lower cost of capital, and a number of empirical studies have produced results con-
sistent with that conclusion. Botosan (1997) ﬁnds that in ﬁrms with low analyst following, there is a negative
relationship between the cost of equity and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Francis et al. (2005) also ﬁnd
that ﬁrms engaging in more extensive disclosure have a lower cost of both debt and equity after controlling for
cross-country institutional diﬀerences in legal and ﬁnancial systems.
As the Chinese stock market is still in its early stages of development, whether agency theory, which applies
in the United States, holds among Chinese public companies is an empirical question. Wang et al. (2008) test
the relationship between disclosure and the cost of debt using a partial Chinese dataset and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
association. We carry out a similar test in this study using a large sample of ﬁrms in the Chinese stock market
to determine whether there is any association between the cost of equity and voluntary disclosure in the Chi-
nese context. Our ﬁnal hypothesis is as follows:
H11. The cost of equity is negatively related to the disclosure level.3. Methodology
3.1. Sample selection
The ﬁrms included in this study were selected from the entire list of companies that traded shares on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges at the end of 2006. As of December 31, 2006, there were 576 ﬁrms
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 824 ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Banks and
insurance ﬁrms were excluded because their business activities and ﬁnancial reports are not comparable with
those of ﬁrms in other industries. A few additional ﬁrms were also excluded, as they lacked some of the
Table 1
Sample description.
Number of ﬁrms %
Panel A: Industry distribution
Real estate 117 10.98
Commercial 74 6.94
Public service 72 6.75
Industrial ﬁrms 730 68.48
Other 73 6.85
Total 1066 100.00
Panel B: Ultimate ownership
State-controlled 722 67.73
Private-controlled 336 31.52
Foreign ﬁrm-controlled 8 0.75
Total 1066 100.00
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on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. These ﬁrms represent more than 80% of all public companies in China in
2006.
Disclosure level information was collected for each ﬁrm from the annual reports published by the two stock
exchanges. Information about their attributes and cost of equity was collected from the WIND and GTA dat-
abases. Table 1 presents the industry and ultimate controller categories of the sample ﬁrms.3.2. Variable measurement
3.2.1. Dependent variable: disclosure index
Following previous studies (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke and Wallace, 1989; Ferguson et al., 2002;
Gray et al., 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; Botosan, 1997; Xiao et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2008), we use a two-step
approach to develop a disclosure index for the sample ﬁrms:
Step 1. Generate a preliminary list of 136 items as the initial disclosure index.
Step 2. Use Chinese accounting standards to select discretionary items from the 136-item list to create the
ﬁnal disclosure index.
As a result, 17 items related to mandatory disclosure are eliminated. The ﬁnal voluntary disclosure index
thus includes 119 items, all of which are evaluated with the corresponding information disclosed in the sample
ﬁrms’ annual reports, and serves to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure.7
For most of the items, the following quantitative measure is used. If a ﬁrm disclosed an item from the list, it
receives a score of 1 and 0 otherwise. For forecast items, the following quantitative measure is adopted. A
score of 2 is assigned for these items if a ﬁrm provided a point estimate, a score of 1 if it provided interval
estimates and a score of 0 if it provided no forecast of any kind. The sum of the scores that a ﬁrm received
for all items was its raw score. Because we focus on all users of corporate annual reports rather than any spe-
ciﬁc user group requiring specialized information, we do not assign diﬀerent weights to diﬀerent items, but
assume that each item is equally important when computing the raw score (see Cooke, 1989; Gray et al.,
1995). Similar to Botosan (1997), we calculate the disclosure score by a relative value, which is the raw score
of an individual ﬁrm divided by the maximum raw score in the sample and multiplied by 1/5, as follows:7 SeeDSCOREi ¼ RAW SCORE
i
MAX SCORE
 20%Appendix A.
Table 2
Explanation of independent variables.
Firm size (LMV) Natural log of total assets at year-end
Leverage (D/A) Ratio of total debt to total assets at year-end
Assets-in-place (FA/A) Ratio of ﬁxed assets to total assets at year-end
Liquidity (Liquidity) Current ratio of ﬁrm at year-end
Return on equity (ROE) Net income divided by shareholders’ equity at year-end
Auditor type (Audit) Dummy variable, where 1 represents a ﬁrm audited by the BIG-4, and 0 otherwise
Ownership diﬀusion (Avershare) Average proportion of shares held by each individual investor
Non-executive directors (NED) Proportion of non-executive directors on the board
State ownership (State) Proportion of shares held by the government
Intermediary and legal
environments (I&L)
Index developed by Fan et al. (2007) that represents the development of the intermediary and legal
environment of China’s provinces
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The independent variables are ﬁrm attributes that we judge to be possible determinants of a ﬁrm’s disclo-
sure level. These variables, listed in Table 2, were measured using 2006 year-end data from the WIND and
GTA databases.3.2.3. Cost of equity
A variety of methods have been developed to measure the cost of equity. Typical among these are the div-
idend discount model (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Francis et al., 2008), applied cost of capital
model (Ashton, 2005) and generalized least squares (GLS) model (Gebhardt et al., 2001). As the ﬁrst two of
these rely on forecast and value-line information, which are unavailable in China, we adopt the GLS model
developed by Gebhardt et al. (2001). The model structure is as follows:8 WeP t ¼ Bt þ FROEtþ1  rtð1þ rtÞ Bt þ
FROEtþ2  rt
ð1þ rtÞ2
Btþ1 þ TVwhere Bt = the book value of the ﬁrm in 2006 divided by the number of shares outstanding in each period,
rt = the cost of equity, and FOREt+I = the forecast ROE for period t + i. For the ﬁrst six periods,
8 we obtain
the values directly from the ﬁrms’ annual reports. Beyond the sixth period, we forecast FORE using a linear
interpolation to the industry median ROE. Bt+I = Bt+i1 + FEPSt+I  FDPSt+i, where FDPSt+i is the fore-
cast dividend per share for period t + i, estimated using the current dividend payout ratio (k). We assume
FDPSt+i = FEPSt+i  k. Finally, TV refers to the terminal value of the ﬁrm. For any horizon T, the terminal
value calculation is given asTV ¼
XT1
i¼3
FROEtþi  rt
ð1þ rtÞi
Btþi þ FROEtþT  rt
rtð1þ rtÞT1
BtþTConsistent with Gebhardt et al. (2001), we forecast earnings for up to 12 periods and estimate a terminal value,
TV, for cash ﬂows beyond period 6. The industry target ROE is a moving median of the ROEs of all ﬁrms in a
given industry in the 10 years prior to 2006. We exclude loss ﬁrms on the assumption that the population of
proﬁtable ﬁrms better reﬂects long-term industry equilibrium rates of returns. The dividend payout ratio (k)
is calculated as the average dividend payout ratio over the past 10 years or as long as the ﬁrm remains listed.4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables in this
study. The raw score ranges from 23 to 70 and DSCORE from 1.6429 to 5. The overall mean for DSCOREcalculate the cost of equity over a quarterly horizon.
Table 3
Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
Panel A: Descriptive statistics, N = 1066
Raw score 41.4545 42 70 23 7.3036
DSCORE 0.1184 0.12 0.2 0.0657 0.0209
LMV 21.4583 21.2699 27.3962 19.4364 1.0256
D/A 0.5074 0.5198 5.4936 0.0207 0.2354
Liquidity 0.8571 0.9291 1 0.0524 0.1766
FA/A 0.3240 0.2947 0.9564 0.0005 0.1911
ROE 8.0173 7.17 104.49 -175.5 14.7212
Audit 0.0732 0 1 0 0.2605
Avershare 0.0546 0.0405 0.3432 0.0016 0.0484
NED 0.3558 0.3333 1 0.1111 0.0656
I&L 6.6287 5.52 13.07 1.49 3.2219
State 0.3158 0.3401 0.8375 0 0.2300
Variable Raw score DSCORE LMV D/A FA/A Liquidity ROE Audit Aver-share NED I&L State
Panel B: Correlation matrix
Raw score 1.00
DSCORE 0.99* 1.00
LMV 0.11* 0.1021* 1.00
D/A 0.01 0.01 0.06* 1.00
FA/A 0.08* 0.0922* 0.11* 0.01 1.00
Liquidity 0.10* 0.0834* 0.23* 0.14* 0.34* 1.00
ROE 0.10* 0.0896* 0.30* 0.13* 0.08* 0.03* 1.00
Audit 0.06 0.06 0.44* 0.04* 0.09* 0.15* 0.04 1.00
Avershare 0.02 0.02 0.14* 0.01 0.15* 0.16* 0.17* 0.08* 1.00
NED 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.001 0.04* 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04* 1.00
I& L 0.11* 0.0972* 0.17* 0.03* 0.19* 0.08* 0.04* 0.17* 0.03* 0.04* 1.00
State 0.04 0.03 0.27* 0.02 0.17* 0.16* 0.02* 0.09* 0.22* 0.06* 0.05* 1.00
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
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ﬁrms were audited by Big 4 auditors. A relatively high proportion of shares in the sample ﬁrms were held by
the government (the mean value is 31.58%).
Panel B of Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation between each pair of independent variables. It is gen-
erally accepted that correlations between independent variables are not harmful in multivariate analysis unless
they exceed 0.80 or 0.90 (Gujarati, 1988). The Pearson correlation values shown in Panel B suggest that mul-
ticollinearity between the independent variables is unlikely to pose a serious problem in interpreting the results
of our multivariate analysis, as they are all less than the stated threshold.4.2. Multivariate tests
4.2.1. Results for commonly tested factors in China
Of the independent variables included in this study, the most commonly tested in the Chinese context are
ﬁrm size, leverage, assets-in-place, liquidity, ROE, auditor type, ownership diﬀusion, and the proportion of
non-executive directors. We use an OLS model as a multivariate test to assess the eﬀect of each of these vari-
ables on voluntary disclosure in the Chinese market. Our test is based on the following model.DSCORE ¼ b0 þ b1LMVþ b2D=Eþ b3FA=Aþ b4Liquidityþ b5ROEþ b6Auditþ b7Avershare
þ b8NEDþ eTo account for diﬀerences in voluntary disclosure in diﬀerent industries, an additional test is performed using
the adjusted disclosure score (Adj-DSCORE) rather than DSCORE. A ﬁrm’s Adj-DSCORE is equal to its
DSCORE minus the average DSCORE of the industry to which it belongs. The adjusted model is as follows:
Table
Relatio
Variab
LMV
D/A
FA/A
Liquid
ROE
Audit
Aversh
NED
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Obs.
Adjust
F-stat
p-Valu
* Stati
** Stat
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þ b8NEDþ eThe results of these tests are summarized in Table 4, which shows that the general regression and industry-
adjusted regression results are consistent for most of the variables, implying that they are quite robust. The
coeﬃcients of ﬁrm size and assets-in-place are highly signiﬁcant, whereas those for leverage, ROE, and own-
ership diﬀusion are only marginally signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings are consistent with both existing theories and
our hypotheses. The sign of auditor type, in contrast, is signiﬁcantly negative, which is inconsistent with our
prediction, prior empirical ﬁndings (Xiao et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2008) and traditional signaling theory. It is
possible that ﬁrms audited by the Big 4 attract more attention than other ﬁrms and release more information
through other channels, such as the media, and therefore rely less on voluntary disclosure in annual reports.
The coeﬃcient of liquidity is negative and marginally signiﬁcant in the general regression, but losses its signif-
icance in the industry-adjusted regression. These test results indicate that we can take liquidity and the pro-
portion of non-executive directors on the board as insigniﬁcant variables in explaining voluntary disclosure
levels.4.2.2. Speciﬁc roles of intermediary and legal environments and state ownership
China stands out from other counties in terms of its large and diversiﬁed regions and the state ownership of
its ﬁrms. We test H8 and H9 to determine the inﬂuence of the intermediary and legal environments (I&L) and
state ownership (State) on the disclosure level. We add these two variables into the equation to determine
whether they have additional explanatory power. As previous empirical studies have reported inconsistent
evidence concerning the sign of state ownership, we hypothesize a convex quadratic association between State
and DSCORE. The models we test are as follows:DSCORE ¼ b0 þ b1LMV þ b2D=Eþ b3FA=Aþ b4Liquidityþ b5ROEþ b6Audit þ b7Avershare
þ b8NEDþ b9I&Lþ b10Stateþ b11State2 þ e4
nship between general factors and voluntary disclosure level.
le Expected sign General regression Industry-adjusted regression
+ 0.0026*** 0.0357***
(3.51) (3.42)
+ 0.0071* 0.1052**
(1.92) (2.05)
+ 0.0072** 0.1251**
(1.99) (2.49)
ity + 0.0068* 0.0642
(1.72) (1.15)
+ 0.0001* 0.0012*
(1.89) (1.85)
+ 0.0098*** 0.1383**
(3.59) (3.61)
are + 0.0248* 0.3320*
(1.77) (1.70)
+ 0.0061 0.0923
(0.57) (0.63)
nt 1.5881 0.7878
(3.59) (3.21)
1038 1038
ed R2 0.0348 0.0337
5.68 5.53
e (0.0000) (0.0000)
stically signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
istically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
tistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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þ b7Avershareþ b8NEDþ b9I&Lþ b10Stateþ b11State2 þ eThe results are summarized in Table 5. When I&L and State are added to the equation, assets-in-place loses its
signiﬁcance in the general regression, and ownership diﬀusion becomes insigniﬁcant in both regressions. The
signs and signiﬁcance of the other common factors remain the same as those reported in Section 4.2.1. These
results are consistent with both independence between these factors and between I&L and state ownership.
The coeﬃcient of I&L, 0.0007/0.0079 (p < 0.01), is not in the hypothesized direction, which suggests
that ﬁrms operating in provinces with a more advanced market and better legal environment disclose less
information than those in less developed environments. One explanation for the negative statistical association
between I&L and DSCORE is that there may be some substitution eﬀect between I&L and voluntary disclo-
sure. The overall legal environment in China is incomplete, and thus, management rarely focuses on litigation
risk and legal rights. At the same time, intermediary institutions may not put pressure on ﬁrms to disclose
more information in annual reports. However, voluntary disclosure and legal advances compensate for each
other. Hence, companies in regions with an advanced legal environment tend to disclose less information
because the environment itself serves as a signal of a good reputation and transparency.
The coeﬃcients of State and State2 are highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) in both regressions, and their directions
are consistent with H8. This convex association suggests that the disclosure level initially decreases with state
ownership, but after a certain point, it increases with an increase in state ownership. This ﬁnding is largely
consistent with those of previous studies on state ownership in the Chinese market (Ferguson et al., 2002).
To further verify it, we conduct another test, as reported in the next section.5
nship between I&L, state ownership and voluntary disclosure level.
le Expected sign General regression Industry-adjusted regression
+ 0.0026*** 0.0363***
(3.35) (3.32)
+ 0.0073** 0.1082**
(2.00) (2.11)
+ 0.0050 0.1005**
(1.37) (1.97)
ity + 0.0063 0.0586
(1.59) (1.05)
+ 0.0001* 0 .0012*
(1.87) (1.83)
+ 0.0086*** 0.1239***
(3.12) (3.22)
are + 0.0205 0.2743
(1.44) (1.37)
+ 0.0045 0.0761
(0.43) (0.52)
+ 0.0007*** 0.0079***
(3.16) (2.69)
 0.0215** 0.2615**
(2.28) (1.99)
+ 0.0349** 0.4097**
(2.40) (2.01)
nt 0.0691 0.7303
(3.84) (2.90)
1038 1038
ed R2 0.0459 0.0409
5.53 5.02
e (0.0000) (0.0000)
stically signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
istically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
tistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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The evidence in Section 4.2.2 suggests a convex quadratic association between the disclosure level and the
proportion of government ownership. At-test and multiple-OLS regression are now used to further investigate
the underlying relationship.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of a t-test between the subgroup of ﬁrms ultimately controlled by the
government and those ultimately controlled by private families. The null hypothesis that there is no diﬀerence
in the proportion of government ownership between the two groups (H0: diﬀ = 0) is rejected at the p = 0.01
level, indicating that a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence does exist. This diﬀerence is 0.3693, which suggests
that ﬁrms ultimately controlled by the government have a much larger proportion of their shares in govern-
ment hands (36.93%). This ﬁnding is consistent with our analysis in Section 4.2.2.
In performing separate multiple regressions for these two groups, many disparities emerge. Firm size and
ROE become insigniﬁcant for the privately controlled ﬁrms, whereas they remain highly signiﬁcant for gov-
ernment-controlled ﬁrms. Debt becomes an insigniﬁcant variable for the latter. This is an unsurprising ﬁnding
in the Chinese context, where state-owned companies are more likely to obtain bank loans because of theTable 6
State ownership and voluntary disclosure level.
Group Observ. Mean Std. dev.
Panel A: T-test of the diﬀerence in state ownership between privately controlled and government-controlled ﬁrms
0 336 0.0656 0.1329
1 722 0.4349 0.1603 t = 36.7576***
Variable Private controller Government controller
General regression Industry-adjusted regression General regression Industry-adjusted regression
Panel B: Regression results
LMV 0.0013 0.0155 0.0029*** 0.0401***
(0.83) (0.73) (3.05) (3.03)
D/A 0.0140** 0.2143** 0.0047 0.0657
(2.10) (2.33) (1.05) (1.04)
FA/A 0.0040 0.0730 0.0028 0.0785
(0.55) (0.72) (0.66) (1.29)
Liquidity 0.00002 0.0234 0.0075* 0.0734
(0.00) (0.19) (1.66) (1.15)
ROE 0.00002 0.0001 0 .0001** 0.0020**
(0.27) (0.11) (2.11) (2.27)
Audit 0.0093 0.1412* 0.0075** 0.1080**
(1.56) (1.72) (2.30) (2.36)
Avershare 0.0459** 0.5903** 0.0088 0.0294
(2.31) (2.15) (0.40) (0.09)
NED 0.0220 0.2990 0.0028 0.0546
(0.95) (0.93) (0.24) (0.33)
I&L 0.0001 0.0002 0.0010*** 0.0118***
(0.31) (0.04) (4.08) (3.31)
State 0.0152* 0.2101* 0.0092* 0.0948
(1.77) (1.77) (1.83) (1.33)
Constant 0.0890 ** 0.3905 0.0634 *** 0.8142***
(2.46) (0.78) (3.01) (2.74)
Obs. 328 328 702 702
Adjusted R2 0.0189 0.0190 0.0688 0.0581
F-stat 1.63 1.63 6.18 5.33
p-Value (0.0972) (0.0963) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: A ﬁrm belongs to group 0 if it is ultimately controlled by a private family and to group 1 if it is ultimately controlled by the
government.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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the potential relationship between debt and the disclosure level.
The roles of assets-in-place and liquidity are not very signiﬁcant in either group when tested separately.
Ownership diﬀusion, measured by Avershare, is signiﬁcantly positive for privately controlled ﬁrms, whereas
no signiﬁcant relationship is found in government-controlled ﬁrms. This result is consistent with monitoring
theory. When the government takes primary responsibility for monitoring state-owned ﬁrms, ownership dif-
fusion becomes less important.
Auditor type remains negatively and signiﬁcantly related to the disclosure level, whereas the proportion of
non-executive directors on the board remain in signiﬁcant in both regressions. It is a not very surprising that
I&L becomes in signiﬁcant for privately controlled ﬁrms, and no existing theory provides a satisfactory expla-
nation. The coeﬃcient of state ownership in the regression on the private subgroup is 0.0152 (0.2101) and
highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.1). The same coeﬃcient in the general regression on the government group is 0.0092
and signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level, whereas in the industry-adjusted regression on this group, it is 0.0948, which is
less signiﬁcant than that in the general regression. This ﬁnding further veriﬁes our conjecture in Section 4.2.2
that the type of ultimate controller explains the quadratic association between state ownership and the disclo-
sure level, at least in part.
5. Cost of equity
Establishing the relationship between the cost of equity and voluntary disclosure aﬀords a deeper under-
standing of the economic consequences of such disclosure. To determine this critical relationship, we perform
the following OLS regression.Cost ¼ b0 þ b1Adj-DSCOREþ b2LA þ b3D=Eþ b4Betaþ b5ROAþ b6Analystþ e
where LA is the natural log of the book value of total assets; D/E is the market value of debt divided by equi-
ty; Beta is the beta value in the past 100 days; ROA is return on assets; and Analyst is the number of analysts
following the ﬁrm.Table 7
Regression results for the cost of equity model.
Variable General regression adjusted for industry cluster
Adj-DSCORE 0.0006 0.0006
(0.20) (0.23)
LA 0.0124*** 0.0124***
(10.31) (6.11)
D/E 0.0006 0.0006
(0.44) (0.24)
Beta 0.0073* 0.0073
(1.82) (1.49)
Analyst 0.0015*** 0.0015***
(8.53) (5.38)
ROA 0.0591*** 0.0591**
(3.15) (2.66)
Constant 0.2210*** 0.2210***
(8.03) (5.86)
Control industry Yes Yes
Obs. 760 760
Adjusted R2 0.3400 0.3621
F-stat 16.10
p-Value (0.0000)
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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score was thus employed in this equation to alleviate any industry inﬂuence on the cost of equity. LA and
ROA are adopted to control for the eﬀects of ﬁrm size and performance on the cost of equity, and the D/
E ratio is used to measure the leverage risk of individual ﬁrms. These three factors are the same as those used
by Wang et al. (2008). In addition to these ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, we add two other factors in the regres-
sion: Beta and Analyst. Beta is a proxy for the relative market risk of individual ﬁrms, and Analyst represents
the public attention paid to a ﬁrm. Both have been veriﬁed as relevant to the cost of equity (Botosan and
Plumlee, 2002; Francis et al., 2008). We also control for industry eﬀects using dummy variables. Table 7
reports the results of this regression analysis, including the general regression and standard errors adjusted
for industry clustering.
The Wang et al. (2008) OLS model has very little explanatory power, whereas the adjusted R2 in our test is
16.1%, which is suggestive of better explanatory power. Contrary to our hypothesis, the coeﬃcient of Adj-
DSCORE is not signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the evidence in Wang et al. (2008) and suggests that inves-
tors in China do not rely too much on the voluntary disclosure information in annual reports. In other words,
such information is not a credible predictor of stock price movements. LA, Beta, and Analyst, in contrast, all
have signiﬁcant explanatory power in our model. Our ﬁndings suggest that larger ﬁrms face a higher cost of
equity, which is contrary to the ﬁndings of most studies. The coeﬃcient of Beta is positive and marginally sig-
niﬁcant, whereas that of Analyst is negative and highly signiﬁcantly related to the cost of capital.
6. Conclusion
This study investigates the determinants and features of voluntary disclosure among companies listed on
the Chinese stock market. Using a sample representing more than 80% of all public companies in China,
we ﬁnd evidence that diﬀers from the ﬁndings of previous studies employing smaller samples, indicating that
the Chinese stock market has a number of distinct features in connection with voluntary disclosure.
In tests of the entire sample, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm size, leverage, assets-in-place, ROE, and ownership diﬀusion
are signiﬁcantly associated with voluntary disclosure and that auditor type and the intermediary and legal
environments are highly signiﬁcantly associated with voluntary disclosure. The sign on auditor type does
not conform to previous studies, suggesting a diﬀerent situation in China. We also ﬁnd a quadratic convex
association between state ownership and disclosure level, which helps to explain the inclusive empirical evi-
dence presented by Xiao et al. (2004) and Wang et al. (2008).
When subsamples are tested, many of the explanatory variables lose their signiﬁcance in one or both
groups. This disparity suggests a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in ﬁrm characteristics and accounting policy preferences
between government and privately controlled ﬁrms. More importantly, the signs of the coeﬃcients of state
ownership in these two regressions are in opposite directions. The disclosure level decreases with state own-
ership in the privately controlled subsample, but increases with it in the government-controlled subsample,
revealing a clear quadratic relationship. Furthermore, voluntary disclosure exerts no signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the cost of equity, which casts doubt on the relevance of the voluntary information disclosed in annual
reports to investors’ decisions in the Chinese context.
The ﬁndings of this study will help Chinese regulators to ﬁne-tune the country’s regulatory policies to better
suit the needs of the market. For instance, both state-owned businesses with a lower proportion of state own-
ership and private businesses with a higher proportion of such ownership may require more regulation to
guarantee transparency. The ﬁndings will also beneﬁt investors by providing them with a better understanding
of the credibility of the annual reports supplied by companies with certain characteristics. The irrelevance of
voluntary disclosure to the cost of equity reveals several deﬁciencies in the Chinese stock market and points to
the need for better regulation and reform.
These potential implications of our ﬁndings suggest the desirability of future research that further reﬁnes
and broadens our analysis. Three limitations of the study are particularly worth mentioning. First, the study
involved a one-year test. Although industry and ultimate controller biases are controlled for, it is possible that
there are year-speciﬁc inﬂuences, particularly with regard to the cost of equity. Second, although most of our
regression models are statistically signiﬁcant, their range of adjusted R-squares suggests that other potential
determinants of voluntary disclosure may exist. Finally, we focus on only one form of disclosure vehicle, the
Y. Lan et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 265–285 281annual report. Additional studies could be conducted to analyze other vehicles, such as quarterly reports and
press releases.
What is the beneﬁt of voluntary disclosure for Chinese ﬁrms? We posit two possible beneﬁts for testing in
further research: future seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs) and a lower cost of equity in the future. First, as
Chen and Wang (2007) report, Chinese listed ﬁrms prefer to issue additional shares after their initial public
oﬀering through SEOs. To attract investors for future SEOs, ﬁrms have the motivation to disclose more infor-
mation than is mandatory. Second, although we are unable to ﬁnd any evidence to indicate that voluntary
disclosure aﬀects the cost of equity in this study, the Chinese stock market is developing very quickly. As inves-
tors become more experienced, it is likely that ﬁrms engaging in more extensive voluntary disclosure will ben-
eﬁt in terms of a lower cost of equity in the future.
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Appendix A
List of voluntary disclosure itemsGeneral information
1. Corporate history
2. Corporate structure
3. Statement of strategy and objectives: general
4. Statement of strategy and objectives: ﬁnancial
5. Statement of strategy and objectives: marketing
6. Statement of strategy and objectives: social
7. Detailed strategic plan and barriers
Financial information
(a) Macro economic analysis
8. Index of selling prices
9. Index of raw material prices
10. Impacts of environment, policy and law
(b) Industry analysis
11. Industry trend analysis
12. Competitor analysis
(c) Trend analysis
13. Discussion of industry trends: prior
14. Discussion of industry trends: future
(d) Financial review data
15. Net proﬁt
16. Gearing ratios
17. Current ratios
18. Return on equity
19. Other ratios
20. Increase in income
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22. Increase in net proﬁts
23. Increase in ROA
(e) Analysis of ﬁnancial performance
24. Analysis of why income has changed
25. Analysis of why sales have changed
26. Analysis of why costs have changed
27. Analysis of why gross proﬁts have changed
28. Analysis of why gross margins have changed
29. Analysis of why net proﬁts have changed
30. Analysis of why core business proﬁts have changed
31. Analysis of why core business incomes have changed
32. Analysis of why core business costs have changed
33. Analysis of why income from other businesses has changed
34. Analysis of why non-operating income has changed
35. Analysis of why non-operating expenditures have changed
36. Analysis of why administrative costs have changed
37. Analysis of why operational costs have changed
38. Analysis of why ﬁnancial costs have changed
39. Analysis of why interest income (or cost) has changed
40. Analysis of why inventories have changed
41. Analysis of why construction in process has changed
42. Analysis of why engineering materials have changed
43. Analysis of why accounts receivable have changed
44. Analysis of why accounts payable have changed
45. Analysis of why notes receivable have changed
46. Analysis of why other accounts receivable have changed
47. Analysis of why other accounts payable have changed
48. Analysis of why notes payable have changed
49. Analysis of why accounts payable in advance have changed
50. Analysis of why pre-paid accounts have changed
51. Analysis of why capital expenditures have changed
52. Analysis of why R&D expenditures have changed
53. Analysis of why return on investment has changed
54. Analysis of why market shares have changed
55. Analysis of why cash ﬂows have changed
56. Analysis of why cash and cash equivalents have changed
57. Analysis of why currency assets have changed
58. Analysis of why intangible assets have changed
59. Analysis of why debts have changed
60. Analysis of why total assets have changed
61. Analysis of why debts due in one year have changed
62. Analysis of why ﬁxed assets have changed
63. Analysis of why ROE has changed
64. Analysis of why long-term investment has changed
65. Analysis of why short-term investment has changed
66. Analysis of why taxes payable have changed
67. Analysis of why wages or welfare payable have changed
68. Analysis of why short-term debts have changed
69. Analysis of why long-term debts have changed
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71. Analysis of why accrued expenses have changed
72. Analysis of why long-term payables have changed
(f) Comments on ﬁnancial performance
73. Comments on income ratios
74. Comments on gearing ratios
75. Comments on current ratios
76. Comments on other ratios
(g) Forecast information
77. Diﬀerence between last-period forecasts of revenue and actual revenue
78. Diﬀerence between last-period forecasts of costs and actual costs
79. Diﬀerence between last-period forecasts of sales and actual sales
80. Forecasts of the market value of stocks
81. Forecasts of cash ﬂows
82. Forecasts of capital expenditures
83. Forecasts of returns on R&D expenditures
84. Forecasts of revenue
85. Forecasts of sales
86. Forecasts of revenues from main business
87. Forecasts of costs
88. Forecasts of product quantities
89. Forecasts of proﬁts
90. Eﬀects of future opportunities on sales and proﬁts
91. Eﬀects of future risks on sales and proﬁts
Non-ﬁnancial information
(a) Analysis of products and markets
92. Discussion of product development
93. Description of marketing network: domestic
94. Description of marketing network: foreign
(b) Business issues
95. Description of business issues
96. Description of plans to resolve issues
97. Description of consequences of issues
98. Comments on issues
(c) Managerial information
99. Structure of the board of directors
100. General information about directors and senior managers
101. Work experience of directors and senior managers
102. Shares held by directors and senior managers
103. Pay packages of directors and senior managers
104. Description of reasons for board member changes
(d) Shareholder information
105. Description of top-10 shareholders
106. Description of institutional shareholder relationship
107. Description of ultimate controllers
108. Description of other shareholders holding more than 10% of total shares
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109. Description of IPO
110. Description of year-end market value
111. Analysis of ﬂuctuation in stock prices
112. Analysis of changes in dividend policy
(f) Analysis of employees
113. General information about employees
114. Employee training and welfare
115. Description of safety issues and costs
(g) Others
116. Description of important matters concerning guarantees
117. Description of investment performance and comments on any changes
118. Description of utilization of raised funds
119. Description of utilization of non-raised fundsReferences
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